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Washoe Cty. Sch. Dist. v. White, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 43 (June 29, 2017)1
CONTRACT LAW: ARBITRATION AWARDS
Summary
Kara White (“White”) was terminated from her role as elementary school principal after
the school district’s decision to terminate her was affirmed in an arbitration hearing. White filed a
motion to vacate the award in district court. The district court granted White’s motion, holding
that (1) the arbitrator exceeded his authority, (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded NRS
391.3116, and (3) the award was arbitrary and capricious. The school district appealed to the
Supreme Court of Nevada, which reversed the district court’s ruling.
Background
From 2008 to 2013, Kara White (“White”) was employed as a principal for a Washoe
County elementary school. White was a member of respondent Washoe School Principals’
Association (“WSPA”), and WSPA and the appellant Washoe County School District (“District”)
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governing the District’s employment
terms.
During White’s first year in her role as principal, she was trained on school funds use,
including use of student activity funds (“SAFs”). In 2009, White’s school was audited. The audit
report revealed that the school had improperly used SAFs, and that White had signed off on checks
she had issued to herself. The District discussed the report with White and told her to reference the
SAFs manual (Manual). In writing, White responded that she would no longer permit or engage in
the improper use of SAFs.
In 2013, upon a staff member’s report of White’s improper use of school funds, the District
began an investigation, which included a SAFs audit from 2011 to 2013. The audit revealed that
over $9,000 of the school’s SAFs expenditures were inappropriate. White was notified that her
actions violated NRS 391.312 for:
(c) Unprofessional conduct; . . . (i) Inadequate
performance; . . . (k) Failure to comply with such
reasonable requirements as a board may prescribe;
(1) Failure to show normal improvement and
evidence of professional training and growth; . . . (p)
Dishonesty.
The District found that White’s responses to the audit were “less than credible” since she
claimed to be unaware of the Manual. As such, the District concluded that White’s responses were
“dishonest,” and resulted in violation of NRS 391.312 for “[d]ishonesty.” The District’s deputy
superintendent upheld the termination recommendation, and White appealed the termination
decision to arbitration.
The arbitration hearing was held in 2014, and was administered by arbitrator Alexander
Cohn. Arbitrator Cohn affirmed White’s termination because “she was discharged for just cause”
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for her dishonesty in the matter. White filed a motion to vacate the award in district court, which
the district court granted. It held that (1) Arbitrator Cohn exceeded his authority, (2) Arbitrator
Cohn manifestly disregarded NRS 391.3116, and (3) the Award was arbitrary and capricious. The
District filed the instant appeal.
Discussion
Arbitrator Cohn did not exceed his authority
“The Nevada Arbitration Act provides specific grounds for invalidating an arbitration
award. NRS 38.241(1)(d) dictates that a court shall vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator
exceeded his powers.”2 In particular, “[A]rbitrators exceed their powers when they address issues
or make awards outside the scope of the governing contract.”3 Moreover, an arbitrator “is not free
to contradict the express language of the contract.”4 However, “[a]rbitrators do not exceed their
powers if their interpretation of an agreement, even if erroneous, is rationally grounded in the
agreement.”5 Accordingly, “[a]n award should be enforced so long as the arbitrator is arguably
construing or applying the contract” and “there is a colorable justification for the outcome.”6
Here, there is justification for White’s termination, and it does not contradict the CBA’s
express language. Specifically, Article 1.18 states:
Disciplinary actions. . . taken against postprobationary unit members. . . shall be
progressive in nature and related to the nature of the
infraction. Unit members shall be given reasonable
opportunity for improvement.
The School District shall not discharge . . . a post
probationary bargaining unit member of this unit
without just cause.7
White argued that that the arbitrator’s award contradicted the plain language of Article 18.1
because her termination was not “progressive in nature.” The Court reasoned that Article 18.1 also
requires that the phrase “related to the nature of the infraction” qualify the phrase “progressive in
nature,” and the two combine to modify “[d]isciplinary actions.” Accordingly, the Court
determined that Article 18.1 served to preclude the District from choosing disciplinary actions that
were disproportionate to the misconduct, while allowing the District to impose more severe
penalties for repeated infractions. Indeed, under White’s interpretation, an employee’s first offense
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of misconduct could not result in termination, no matter how severe, and would render the term
“related to the nature of the infraction” meaningless.8
Two common-law grounds in Nevada for reviewing private binding arbitration awards
In Nevada, there are two common-law grounds recognized “under which a court may
review private binding arbitration awards: (1) whether the award is arbitrary, capricious, or
unsupported by the agreement; and (2) whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.”9
Notably, “the former standard ensures that the arbitrator does not disregard the facts or the terms
of the arbitration agreement,” while “the latter standard ensures that the arbitrator recognizes
applicable law.”10
Arbitrator Cohn did not manifestly disregard the law
The award provides that (1) “any inclination to reverse [White’s] discharge and substitute
progressive discipline[,] such as . . . an opportunity to improve . . . , is washed away by the
dishonesty finding”; and (2) “the District has carried its burden to show [that White] violated
NRS 391.[3]12(1)(c); (i); (k); (l); (p).” Based on this language, White argued that Arbitrator Cohn
manifestly disregarded NRS 391.311611 by ignoring the CBA’s Article 18.1 and relying on
NRS 391.312412 in finding just cause to discharge her. The Court disagreed.
“[J]udicial inquiry under the manifest-disregard-of-the-law standard is extremely
limited.”13 Thus, “the issue is not whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the law, but whether
the arbitrator, knowing the law and recognizing that the law required a particular result, simply
disregarded the law.”14
Here, Arbitrator Cohn cited to NRS 391.3116 in a footnote, which states “NRS 391.3116
provides that a [CBA] may super[s]ede the provisions of NRS 391.311 to 391.397.” Despite the
fact that the footnote misstates NRS 391.3116’s language by characterizing its mandatory
exclusion of the relevant statutes as being optional, “we may not concern ourselves with the
correctness of the arbitrator’s interpretation of [NRS 391.3116].”15

See Musser v. Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949, 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (providing that “[a] court should not interpret
a contract so as to make meaningless its provisions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
9
Clark Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 122 Nev. 337, 341, 131 P.3d 5, 8 (2006).
10
Id.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.3116 (2013) (replaced in revision by NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.660 in 2015) provides that
“the provisions of NRS 391.311 to 391.3197, inclusive, do not apply to a . . . licensed employee who has entered into
a contract with the board negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 of NRS if the contract contains separate provisions
relating to the board’s right to dismiss . . . the employee.”
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requirements as a board may prescribe; [f]ailure to show normal improvement and evidence of professional training
and growth; . . . [d]ishonesty.”
13
Clark Cty. Educ. Ass’n, 122 Nev. at 342, 131 P.3d at 8 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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The Award is neither arbitrary nor capricious
“The arbitrary-and-capricious standard does not permit a reviewing court to vacate an
arbitrator’s award based on a misinterpretation of the law.”16 Rather, a court’s review of this
standard is “limited to whether the arbitrator’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in
the record.”17
Here, sufficient evidence existed to support Arbitrator Cohn’s “dishonesty” finding.
Arbitrator Cohn examined the arbitration proceedings’ records and concluded that White’s alleged
lack of understanding in regard to SAFs use and her inability to recall the Manual was so
implausible that her responses during the investigatory meeting were dishonest. The Court also
reasoned that sufficient evidence existed because, inter alia, SAFs training was provided during
White’s first year as a principal; after the 2009 random audit White was specifically told to
reference the Manual; and a copy of the Manual was available at White’s school and on the
school’s website.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that Arbitrator Cohn did not exceed his authority in affirming White’s
termination. The Court further held that Arbitrator Cohn did not manifestly disregard the law and
that his decision was not arbitrary or capricious. As such, the Court reversed the district court’s
order granting White’s motion to vacate the award.
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